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January 12, Wednesday
12:00 – 13:30

A key question in cooperative game theory is that of coalitional stability, usually captured by the notion of the core- the set of outcomes such that no subgroup of players has an incentive to deviate. However, some coalitional games have empty cores, and any outcome in such a game is unstable. In this talk, we investigate the possibility of stabilizing a coalitional game by using external payments (subsidies). We consider a scenario where an external party, which is interested in having the players work together, offers a supplemental payment to the grand coalition, thereby extending the core. We define the cost of stability (CoS) as the minimal external payment that stabilizes the game. We provide general bounds on the cost of stability in several classes of games, and explore its algorithmic properties and its relations with other solution concepts. Joint work with Yoram Bachrach, Edith Elkind, Dmitrii Pasechnik, Michael Zuckerman, Joerg Rothe, and Jeffrey S. Rosenschein.