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March 8, Tuesday
12:00 – 13:00

The security of various cryptosystems in common use has been completely compromised by "side channel attacks", namely, by attacks exploiting leakage of information on the underlying secret keys. Such information leakage typically emanates from physical characteristics inevitably involved in real-world implementations of cryptographic protocols (say, power consumption, timing, or electro-magnetic radiation).

In this talk I will discuss *leakage resilient cryptography* – cryptographic protocols protecting against such side channel attacks. I will focus on the _bounded memory leakage model_ (with Goldwasser and Vaikuntanathan), a model capturing a large class of side channel attacks that laid the foundations for many follow-up works on leakage resilient cryptography, and will exhibit public key encryption schemes resilient to such leakage. As time permits I will also mention extensions of these results to _unbounded memory leakage in distributed settings_ (with Goldwasser and Hazay).